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Abstract
The advent of Frankfurt-style counterexamples in the early 1970s 
posed a problem not merely for incompatibilists, but for compatibilists 
also. At that time compatibilists too were concerned to hold that the 
presence of alternative possibilities was necessary for moral respon-
sibility. Such a classical compatibilism, I argue in this paper, should 
not have been left behind. I propose that we can use a Kratzer-style 
semantics of ‘can’ to model ‘could have done otherwise’ statements 
in such a way that the truth of such expressions is both (i) evidently 
consistent with determinism, and (ii) clearly such that Frankfurt-style 
counterexamples do not count as cases where the agent could not have 
done otherwise.
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1 Introduction
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) has been an important 
principle in the debate concerning free will and determinism. Here 
is a statement of it drawn from Widerker and McKenna (2006: 2).
PAP: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if 
he could have done otherwise.
The principle states a necessary condition for acting in a morally 
responsible fashion—no alternative possibility, no moral responsi-
bility. But why believe PAP? I see it as a presupposition of a certain 
conversational practice of ours. Often, when an individual is accused 
of some sort of misdemeanor and he desires to be exonerated from 
the accusation, he will protest using language of the following sort: 
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‘I couldn’t help it!’ or ‘But there was nothing I could have done!’ or 
‘I wasn’t able to do anything about it!’. Moreover, it isn’t common 
to hear a retort of the sort, ‘It doesn’t matter that you couldn’t help 
it—you are still guilty’. A response like that merely baffles. The far 
more common way to convince the man of his guilt is to say, ‘No, 
you could have helped it. You could have done such-and-such.’ We 
can see PAP, therefore, as a codification of the principle that governs 
this practice. We therefore appear to accept that disclamations of 
the ability to do otherwise (if true) are sufficient for exculpation. 
But if the absence of this ability is sufficient for the absence of moral 
responsibility, then the presence of the ability must be necessary for 
moral responsibility. Hence, PAP.
PAP is an important premise in what I call the Naive Ability Ar-
gument for Incompatibilism. The argument is as follows:
(1) If someone is morally responsible for performing an action at 
t, then they could have done otherwise at t.1
(2) If determinism is true, then, for any time t, no-one could 
have done otherwise than they did at t.2
Ergo,
(3) If determinism is true, then no-one is morally responsible for 
performing any action.
(1) is an expression of PAP, and (2) is the intuitive suggestion that if a 
description of the past up till t in conjunction with the laws of nature 
entails that you perform some action A at t, then you could not, at t, 
have done otherwise than A.
1 Advocates of PAP admit that you may be morally responsible in cases of 
derivative responsibility for an action you performed at t even though you couldn’t 
have done otherwise at t. For example, you are usually still responsible for the 
things you can’t help doing when drunk because you usually could have refrained 
from getting drunk in the first place. But I will take it as read that it is non-deriv-
ative moral responsibility that this paper is concerned with.
2 The first instant of time, if there is such, may be considered an exception to 
this. But since human beings and their acts came to be after the first instant had 
been and gone, this point is immaterial. Make t a variable ranging over all instants 
later than the first instant, if you wish. See Bailey 2012 for discussion.
267A Modest Classical Compatibilism
Compatibilists are split over how to respond to this argument. 
Historically, compatibilists denied premise (2); until the 1970s com-
patibilists were keen to construe abilities in such a way that it was 
clear that, if their account were correct, then determinism didn’t 
remove the ability to do otherwise. Such compatibilists are now 
called ‘classical compatibilists’ (see Berofsky 2006). They typically 
defended conditional analyses of ability, saying something like the 
following:
(CAB) An agent S has the ability to do otherwise at t iff were S 
to try/sufficiently desire/intend to do otherwise at t, they would 
do otherwise.
How they construed the content of the antecedent varied from one 
such compatibilist to another, but it is clear that the truth of deter-
minism is not itself any obstacle to our possessing abilities under-
stood in this fashion. The truth of determinism entails that they won’t 
try/sufficiently desire/intend to do otherwise; nevertheless, were this 
to happen, they would do otherwise.
But compatibilists fell away from this view. Beginning in the 
1970s, a new breed of compatibilist appeared: the semi-compatibil-
ist. With John Martin Fischer as their leader, they grew in numbers 
and influence until they became the dominant strain in compatibilist 
thought. The semi-compatibilist responds to the argument by de-
nying (1)—he judges it a mistake to suppose that the ability to do 
otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility.
What accounts for this changing of the guard? What gave the 
semi-compatibilist the chutzpah necessary to deny such an intuitive 
principle? Several things. On the one hand, there were Austin (1961) 
and Lehrer’s (1968) attacks on CAB. But the chief catalyst of change 
came in 1969 with Frankfurt’s influential paper ‘Alternate Possi-
bilities and Moral Responsibility’. In that paper Frankfurt offered 
several counterexamples to PAP; a developed version of the most 
celebrated of them is as follows.
Black is a neuroscientist of considerable expertise who hates 
Smith. Indeed, Black hates Smith so much that he desires Smith 
dead. Now Black also knows that Jones hates Smith. One day 
Black finds out, to his delight, that Jones has formed a plan to 
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murder Smith. But Jones is a temperamental fellow, and Black 
is worried that Jones might change his mind or that his nerve 
might fail him. So Black implants a device in Jones’s brain without 
Jones’s knowledge. This device monitors Jones’s brain activity, 
and as soon as there is any indication that Jones is not going to fol-
low through on his plan, then Black will use the device to cause 
Jones to kill Smith. As it happens, Jones shows no sign of reneg-
ing on his plan, and he murders Smith.
Surely it is true, says Frankfurt, that (i) Jones is morally responsible 
for killing Smith and that (ii) Jones was not, thanks to Black’s de-
vice, able to do otherwise. So, PAP, says Frankfurt, is false. Semi-
compatibilists agree.
After word of these things spread, classical compatibilism fell out 
of fashion and the semi-compatibilist approach became more popu-
lar. Frankfurt changed everything, or at least the face of compati-
bilism. But I think that was a mistake. I shall defend here a modest 
classical compatibilism that assumes that it is not, strictly speaking, 
abilities that PAP is concerned with, but a certain species of possibility. 
My account builds on the Lewis-Kratzer understanding of ‘can’, and 
it permits us another way of seeing that the truth of determinism is 
compatible with the possibility of doing otherwise. In the next sec-
tion, section 2, I begin by explaining the semantics Angelika Kratzer 
developed for understanding modals like ‘could’ and ‘can’. In section 
3, I clear away some ambiguity in the expression under discussion: 
‘S could have done otherwise’. Section 4 contains the application 
of Kratzer’s apparatus to that same expression. In section 5, I show 
how my account is able to neutralise Frankfurt’s counterexample, 
and also deal with some other concerns.
2 Analysis of modals
David Lewis, in a famous 1976 paper on the paradoxes of time travel, 
considers whether we ought to say, of a man who has travelled back 
in time and who is appropriately situated to kill his grandfather, that 
he can kill his grandfather. On the one hand, we can suppose he 
satisfies all the ordinary criteria for being able to do it (well-armed, 
fit, has an excellent opportunity), and therefore that he can; but on 
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the other hand, it appears sound reasoning that he can’t, for we can 
infer from the man’s very existence that his grandfather survives and 
reproduces. Lewis proposes the following resolution: ‘To say that 
something can happen means that its happening is compossible with 
certain facts. Which facts? That is determined [...] by context. [...] 
What I can do, relative to one set of facts, I cannot do, relative to 
another, more inclusive, set.’ (1976: 150). So, relative to the fellow’s 
intrinsic properties and opportunity, he can kill his grandfather, but 
relative to a broader set of facts that includes his grandfather’s future 
existence, he cannot. Disappointingly, beyond the resolution of this 
paradox, Lewis doesn’t go on to deploy this framework as part of a 
general theory of ability ascriptions.
But Kratzer does. Her approach, like Lewis’s, sees context as 
supplying a set of facts relative to which the ‘can’ claim is assessed. 
In her influential 1977 and 1981 papers (reprinted and revised in 
her 2012a collection), she offers a premise semantics for the modals 
‘must’ and ‘can’, according to which ‘must’ functions to express the 
logical consequence of a proposition from a set of premises and ‘can’ 
functions to express the compatibility of a proposition with a set of 
premises.
By way of illustration, she asks us to consider the following 
expressions:
(A) All Maori children must learn the names of their ancestors.
(B) The ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.
(C) When Kahukura-nui died, the people of Kahungunu said: 
Rakaipaka must be our chief.
The three expressions all contain a ‘must’ but the ‘musts’ appear 
to belong to different modalities. The ‘must’ of (A) appears deontic 
and so concerns something like duty; the ‘must’ of (B) looks like it is 
epistemic; and the ‘must’ of (C) looks like it concerns something like 
prudence: what would be best for the people of Kahungunu.
So, given the apparently different foci of these ‘musts’, what is 
their common element? Kratzer thinks that sentences (A)–(C) are 
incomplete. To make them complete we add something like the 
following:
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(A') Given the duties incumbent on Maori children, they must learn the 
names of their ancestors.
(B') Given what we know, the ancestors of the Maoris must have ar-
rived from Tahiti.
(C') When Kahukura-nui died, the people of Kahungunu said: In 
view of what is best for the tribe, Rakaipaka must be our chief.
The italicised portions indicate the clauses that were suppressed in 
the original expressions, what Kratzer calls the conversational back-
ground. It is these hidden portions that function to pick out the set of 
premises that the central proposition asserted is assessed relative to. 
Following Kratzer’s (2012b) terminology, let’s call this picked out 
set of premises the ‘modal restriction’. So we can distinguish three 
elements in the resulting picture: the modal force—a ‘must’ or a 
‘can’; the modal scope—the central proposition explicitly asserted; 
and the modal restriction—a contextually supplied set of premises 
relative to which the modal scope is assessed.
If we say all that, then we can give an account of the meaning of 
‘must’ and ‘can’ that isn’t a long and tiresome disjunctive one that 
makes reference to every different sort of modality. Instead we can 
just say this:
‘Must’ expresses that the
<modal restriction>      logically implies the   <modal scope>
and ‘can’, being the dual of ‘must’, expresses that the
<modal restriction>  is logically compatible with the  <modal scope>
It isn’t hard to see how we get the modal scope—it is the central 
proposition asserted—but what of the modal restriction? How do 
we arrive at that? The answer lies in the conversational backgrounds. 
In Kratzer’s view these are contextually provided functions that as-
sign to every possible world a set of propositions (the premises). By 
way of example, consider (B’) above. The function that context pro-
vides is an epistemic one, concerned with what a certain group of 
people know. So for each possible world the function assigns a set 
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of propositions (or premises) that include all and only that which is 
common knowledge at that time for that community in that world.
So with f as the contextually supplied function from the set of all 
possible worlds, and w and p being variables ranging over worlds and 
propositions respectively, we can put Kratzer’s central idea in sym-
bols (where the ‘⇒’ denotes strict implication).
‘Must’ expresses that
f(w) ⇒ p
and ‘can’ expresses that
~( f(w) ⇒ ~p).
This much more or less captures Kratzer’s early 1977 work on the 
topic.3 But her later 1981 work gave a more complicated picture. 
She later suggested that the conversational background is really com-
posed of two functions from worlds to sets of premises, namely a 
modal base f and an ordering source g. The modal base functions, as 
above, to get us a set of premises, and the ordering source does the 
same. But the set of propositions derived by the ordering source is 
used to induce an order on the worlds that the modal base is true 
at. Then ‘must p’ holds iff p is true in all worlds closest to the ideal 
specified by the ordering source, and ‘can p’ holds iff p is true in at 
least one of the worlds closest to the ordering source.
I do not wish to go into detail about this later account and the 
reasons for introducing this more complicated apparatus. I will, for 
ease of understanding and accessibility, work with the framework 
given by Kratzer’s earlier account. However, for those familiar with 
Kratzer’s later work, I will make it plain in a later footnote how my 
theory should be stated relative to her more developed account.
3 Analysis of ‘could have done otherwise’
We now need to apply all this to PAP. PAP is the claim that the truth 
of the expression ‘S could have done otherwise’ is necessary for S 
3 I have left out how she handles inconsistent modal restrictions, but that is 
immaterial for my purposes because, on the account I will give, it will not be pos-
sible for the modal restriction to be inconsistent.
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to be morally responsible for whatever act S performed. But ‘could 
have done otherwise’ is an ambiguous expression in at least two ways. 
Firstly, ‘could have’ is ambiguous between a subjunctive and an in-
dicative reading.4 On the indicative reading it occurs as the past form 
of ‘can’, where ‘can’ is understood to mean ‘be able to’, such that ‘S 
could have done otherwise’ means ‘S was able to do otherwise’.5 On 
the subjunctive reading, ‘could have’ is the past form of the present 
tense subjunctive ‘could’. This subjunctive interpretation doesn’t have 
abilities in view, and instead holds that it is various circumstances that 
might have obtained that are in view, various possibilities that could 
have come to pass. On such a reading, the ‘could have’ can be viewed 
as equivalent to the non-epistemic ‘might have’, such that ‘S could 
have ϕ-ed’ means ‘S might have ϕ-ed’, rather than ‘S was able to ϕ’.
So, the indicative ‘could have’ deals with ability, and the subjunc-
tive ‘could have’ talks about possibility. But once we are aware of 
this, the following idea might occur to one: rather than assuming 
that PAP is concerned with the ability to do otherwise, we might 
instead suppose that it is concerned with the possibility of doing oth-
erwise. We could assume that it is only the truth of the subjunctive 
‘could have’ that is necessary for moral responsibility, while sup-
posing that the truth of the indicative ‘could have’ is not, strictly 
speaking, necessary. In this paper, I shall make this assumption. I 
say: grant me this modest assumption, and I can give you a classical 
compatibilism that evades the standard objections.
A great advantage of making this move is that one avoids entirely 
the debate about satisfactory analyses of ability ascriptions. Abilities 
aren’t in view at all, only a certain sort of possibility.
But is it a plausible move to make? Someone might make the 
following objection: ‘But we don’t talk only about whether or not 
someone could have done otherwise, we also talk about, in present 
4 A distinction van Inwagen ably deploys in his 1984 response to Dennett 1984.
5 Or perhaps, more carefully, ‘S was both able and had an opportunity to 
do otherwise’, if we think that the ‘have’ modifier forces our attention to a par-
ticular occasion. ‘I could run a marathon’, where ‘could’ is the past form of the 
abilitative ‘can’, talks about a general ability possessed in the past; ‘I could have 
run a marathon’ suggests that one was able and also in a good position to run a 
marathon on a particular occasion. I thank Simon Kittle for this point.
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cases, whether some individual can do otherwise, and ‘can’ is in the 
indicative.’ It is true that ‘can’ takes the indicative, but it would be 
a mistake to think that, because of this, it must always be abilities 
rather than possibilities in view. A distinction is often drawn be-
tween the ‘“can” of ability’ and the ‘“can” of possibility’ (see Vetter 
2015: 76). That there is a clear possibilist use of ‘can’ can be seen 
from the following examples: ‘You got burgled? Well, these things 
can happen.’ ‘Learning a language can be a difficult affair.’ ‘Proposi-
tions can be true; contradictions cannot be true.’ They all resist a 
parsing into ability language. ‘Burglaries are able to happen.’ ‘Learn-
ing a language is able to be a difficult affair.’ ‘Propositions are able to 
be true, but contradictions aren’t able.’ All such expressions, even if 
one might not be prepared to say that they are strictly incorrect, are 
nevertheless decidedly awkward and unnatural. This is because we 
are trying to get ability-talk to do a job better done by possibility-
talk. One way of detecting the ‘can’ of possibility is to see whether 
the sentence carries an identical meaning if you replace the ‘can’ 
with ‘may’ (just so long as it is clear that the ‘may’ is not expressive 
of permission or the deontic modality). This works for the above 
examples. ‘Burglaries may happen.’ ‘Learning a language may be a 
difficult affair.’ ‘Propositions may be true, but contradictions may 
not.’ This is because ‘may’ can also be used to express possibility.
So, I can accommodate currently occurring moral-responsibility 
contexts by supposing that the ‘can’ in the ‘can do otherwise’ that oc-
curs on such occasions is the ‘can’ of possibility. It might be suspect-
ed that I press for possibility rather than ability because I think that 
Kratzer’s apparatus, for all its success, cannot satisfactorily handle 
abilities.6 I agree that Kratzer’s account appears in its best light when 
it is seen as giving a model of the ‘can’ of possibility, rather than the 
‘can’ of ability. Nevertheless, I do think that the Kratzer semantics 
can give an adequate analysis of ability ascriptions, but I want to save 
all that for another occasion. Defending that supposition would in-
volve, among other things, responding at length to the formal objec-
tions made against the idea by Anthony Kenny (1975: 136–7).
6 Maier’s pessimistic judgement that ‘the Kratzer semantics alone does not 
suffice to settle questions about the agentive modalities.’ (2013: 115) appears to 
be a popular one.
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It might also be objected, however, that we also use ‘able’-talk 
when we talk about whether or not someone ‘can do’ or ‘could have 
done’ otherwise. We also ask ‘are they able to do otherwise?’ and 
‘were they able to do otherwise?’. We do indeed use such expres-
sions, but, on the view I am proposing here, this is a mistake, though 
a very understandable one. Given the incredibly close connection 
between the ‘can’ of ability and the ‘can’ of possibility, and the sub-
junctive ‘could have’ and the indicative ‘could have’, we can’t expect 
the ordinary-language user to pay careful attention to such subtle-
ties, especially in a context that concerns agents. Indeed, we would 
positively expect him to slide, in his benighted ignorance, from 
possibility-talk to ability-talk and back again, thus confounding what 
should be kept separate.
One last objection that might be made at this juncture is this: if 
I am eschewing abilities as, strictly speaking, unnecessary for moral 
responsibility, then it might be wondered if the account I am giving 
is really classically compatibilist at all. Weren’t the classical compati-
bilists of old all concerned to defend the relevance of ability ascrip-
tions to moral responsibility? Well, I agree that they were, but it 
is also nevertheless clear that I am a classical compatibilist of some 
sort. I accept PAP, and therefore accept that the truth of a ‘could 
have done otherwise’ expression is necessary for moral responsibil-
ity. Moreover, I don’t say anything like, ‘People naively supposed 
that alternative possibilities were necessary for moral responsibility. 
But that was a mistake. What we are really interested in when we ask 
whether or not someone could have done otherwise is the following 
feature ...’. That is the sort of thing semi-compatibilists say. I am not 
to be counted amongst their number. I accept the requirement for 
alternative possibilities. That said, I recognise that the account I am 
giving is not as fully fledged or as substantial as other classical com-
patibilisms—but that is why I call it ‘modest’.
Finally, let’s return to the second way in which ‘could have done 
otherwise’ is ambiguous: we don’t know what doing otherwise in-
volves. I shall take it to mean intending otherwise. I think examples 
like Fischer and Ravizza’s ‘Sharks’ case show this (1998: 125). John 
is walking by a pool. He sees a child drowning. He is not inclined to 
get himself wet, so he continues walking. We think John is a wick-
ed man, and we are inclined to blame him for not saving the child. 
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However, unbeknownst to John, there were sharks in the water, 
and, were John to have attempted to rescue the child, he would have 
been set upon and eaten. So, he couldn’t have saved the child in any 
case. Does this mean we cannot blame him? After all, he couldn’t 
have done otherwise than fail to save the child. But I think that only 
shows that he must be guilty on account of the presence of a different 
alternative possibility, namely, that he could have decided to try and 
save the child yet did not. But such decidings and choosings are, I 
shall suppose, simply the forming of intentions. So, we can hold John 
guilty for not intending otherwise than he did.
4 Applying the Kratzer semantics to ‘could have done otherwise’
So, if we are understanding ‘could’ in the way proposed by Kratzer’s 
early model, then we need to ask ourselves: what is the modal re-
striction? It is clear what the modal scope is: it is ‘S intends otherwise 
at t’. But if ‘could’ expresses the compossibility of a set of premises 
with the modal scope, then we need to know what these premises 
are. What sort of conversational background does our ‘could have 
done otherwise’-talk presuppose? If we use ‘ f ’ as a variable ranging 
over functions that perform the role of the modal restriction, then 
we can use ‘ fm’ as a variable ranging over a certain subset of those 
functions, which subset handles the sort of moral-responsibility con-
texts we are concerned with. fm, I shall suppose, will vary according 
to which particular occasion of an agent’s acting is being considered. 
For every possible world in which the agent in question acts on that 
one particular occasion in question, fm will assign to that world a 
non-empty set of propositions. fm is therefore a function from worlds 
to sets of premises; but what are these premises to which it takes us?
If we are to cast the incompatibilist in a Kratzerian mould, then 
he might say this: fm takes from every possible world two things in 
forming the premise set; it takes (i) the laws of nature that hold at that 
world (N) and (ii) a complete description of the history of the universe 
of that world that includes all and only such moments that are prior 
to the agent performing his act at t (D).7 And, indeed, if it is true that
7 Though an incompatibilist such as van Inwagen (1984) would, if I read him 
correctly, take the question of the compossibility of N and D with doing other-
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(4) {N, D} ⇒ ~(S intends otherwise at t),
it therefore follows, if the incompatibilist is right, that S could not 
have intended otherwise relative to this set of premises.
But we don’t need to take the incompatibilist’s word for it that this 
is how to characterise the function in question. It is my contention 
that we should take fm to be a function from worlds to propositions 
describing psychological setups such that the relevant possibility of 
doing otherwise consists in something like psychological compossibil-
ity—the idea that S’s intending otherwise at t must be compossible 
with S’s psychological setup prior to t in order for the morally rel-
evant alternative possibility to obtain. What do I mean to include in 
these psychological setups? Let me explain.
I introduce my account by way of the following distinctions made 
by Robert Kane concerning the ambiguity of the term ‘will’. Kane 
says we ought to distinguish the following three senses of the word 
‘will’:
(i) what I want, desire, or prefer to do
(ii) what I choose, decide, or intend to do
(iii) what I try, endeavor or make an effort to do (Kane 1998: 26)8
He calls (i) the desiderative or appetitive will, (ii) the rational will, 
and (iii) the striving will (1998: 27). The desiderative will is easy to 
understand: it is your desires, your wants. The rational will concerns 
the decisions you make, typically (at least in part) on the basis of your 
desires; if you like to drink coffee, you may decide to purchase some. 
The distinction between the rational and the striving will is more 
subtle, but it is recognised once we realise that deciding to buy some 
coffee isn’t sufficient for striving for some coffee. I may decide to buy 
some coffee while I am at work, but because I know that I won’t have 
the opportunity to buy some coffee until I leave work, I only try or 
wise as a consequence of his account of ability, rather than as an analysis of it.
8 To Kane’s list we might also add commands as a type of will. To flout the 
commands of a monarch is to flout his will, even though the monarch might not 
desire or intend, for some reason(s), that his commands be fulfilled.
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endeavour to buy some coffee after I leave the office.9
Kane also says, ‘If there is indeterminacy in free will, on my view, 
it must come somewhere between the input and the output—be-
tween desiderative and rational will.’ (1998: 27). And this, I think, 
is right. I think all parties to the debate, whether compatibilist, lib-
ertarian or whatever, must acknowledge this threefold distinction 
of will. Moreover, we all also realise that the locus of the free-will 
debate is found here between the desiderative will on the one hand, 
and the rational and striving will on the other. As Kane points out, 
I think we would all be happy with a purely deterministic relation 
from the rational to the striving will, but we are not all happy with a 
deterministic relation from the desiderative will to the rational will, 
for libertarians would take strong exception.
But note that our judgements of praise and approbation are sen-
sitive too to this distinction between the desiderative will and the 
rational will. If a man is genetically disposed to a short temper, then 
we don’t blame him for that. We say something like, ‘He can’t help 
the desires he was born with [the desiderative will], but we can hold 
him accountable for what he does with those desires [the rational 
will] (so long as they don’t compel him)’. The distinction here con-
cerns what an agent is given, what he finds himself with, and what he 
does with what he has been given. The desiderative will concerns the 
former, and the rational will the latter. This distinction is one we all 
intuitively acknowledge in our assessments of moral responsibility.
But once armed with this distinction I think we have all we need 
to state a plausible classical compatibilism. We say that fm—the mod-
al restriction found in PAP—is a function that moves from a world 
to a set of premises that offers a complete description of the relevant 
agent’s desiderative will prior to their choosing. The central sugges-
tion of my paper can therefore be put like this: to claim that ‘S could 
have done otherwise’ in the sense required for moral responsibility is 
just to claim that S’s intending otherwise was compatible with their 
desiderative will. More formally, that
(5) ~(S’s desiderative will ⇒ ~(S intends otherwise)).
9 It may be that the distinction between the rational and the striving will 
doesn’t amount to much. It may be only the distinction between deciding now to 
do something now and deciding now to do something later.
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And to say that ‘S couldn’t have done otherwise’ means
(6) S’s desiderative will ⇒ ~(S intends otherwise).
I think we can see the force of this idea when we consider scenarios 
where we would be inclined to describe the desiderative will as en-
tailing the rational. Consider a case of a man with a strong addiction 
to heroin; in fact, his addiction is so strong that it is literally irresist-
ible. We don’t wish to hold a man responsible for what he does under 
irresistible compulsion, and my account explains why: in such a case 
it looks as if what the agent chooses follows inevitably from his de-
siderative will, his addictive desires. Intuitively speaking, these make 
choosing otherwise impossible relative to the desiderative will and so 
remove his moral responsibility.
So far so good, but in fact (5) and (6) are too weak. A descrip-
tion of the desiderative will by itself doesn’t really entail very much. 
We want it to be the case that the addict’s decision is entailed by 
his desiderative will. But it won’t be, for without any beliefs about 
how to fulfill one’s desires, even an overwhelming desire can find 
no outlet in action. So we should include a description of the agent’s 
doxastic states alongside the description of their desiderative will. 
For the sake of completeness, we might also want to include the 
agent’s experiential states as well, in case we think they might have 
some bearing. I will suppose that the doxastic, desiderative and ex-
periential states of the agent constitute the agent’s psychological setup. 
I intend the psychological setup to include all those aspects of the 
agent’s makeup that are commonly supposed to be the ‘springs of ac-
tion’—beliefs and desires, even if they are not enough to provide an 
analysis of decision, are often considered adequate to account for all 
those features explanatorily relevant to the agent’s decision-making 
in ordinary cases.10 So, we should therefore replace ‘S’s desiderative 
will’ in (5) and (6) with ‘S’s psychological setup’.
Is the psychological setup enough to get us the required entailment 
10 I am not particularly concerned to limit the psychological setup of the agent 
to beliefs, desires and experiences. If it should emerge that it would be better for 
my account to include yet more aspects of the mind as part of the psychological 
setup, then I am happy for the psychological setup to be expanded as required—
with one proviso: that it does not include what I introduce below as the ‘indi-
vidual nature of the agent’.
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from addictive desires to acting upon such desires? It is not, because 
it may be that the addict ceases to exist before any choice issues from 
his mental faculties. So, we need to include S’s continued existence 
(E) alongside a description of S’s psychological setup. But including 
S’s continued existence in (5) and (6) isn’t enough either. For sup-
pose that an addict is going to act on an irresistible desire. We want 
it to be impossible for him to do otherwise. However, again, it won’t 
be, because it may be that an external force (an angel swooping down 
from heaven, say) interferes and causes the addict to intend otherwise 
than that which the desiderative will would have determined. So, we 
must also include the claim that the agent is not interfered with in 
such a way. All I intend to include in this non-interference claim (NI) 
is the idea that no force external to the agent and the agent’s psycho-
logical setup is directly causally responsible for the agent’s producing 
his decision. The only admissible candidates are features intrinsic to 
the agent or his psychological setup. But continued existence (E) and 
non-interference (NI) aren’t enough either; we must also include the 
laws of psychology (P), for without these there is nothing to rule out 
the possibility of an overwhelming desire to φ’s giving rise to ψ-ing 
rather than φ-ing.
The resulting analysis is therefore more complicated. Suppose S 
made a decision at t. Strictly speaking, fm must generate all the above 
premises such that a more complete understanding of ‘S could have 
done otherwise at t’ in the sense required for moral responsibility is 
this:
(7) ~({S’s psychological setup, E, NI, P} ⇒ ~(S intends other-
wise at t)).
Spelled out:
An agent S could have done otherwise at t (in the sense required 
for moral responsibility) iff a description of S’s desiderative will, 
and S’s doxastic and experiential states, over an interval11 imme-
diately prior to t in conjunction with the claims that (i) S con-
tinues to exist until t and (ii) S’s decision-making at t was not 
11 It does not matter which interval, for, even if the interval is very long, what S’s 
psychological setup was like in the distant past won’t be relevant to what it is possible 
for S to intend at t—what will be relevant is S’s psychological setup as t approaches.
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directly caused by any force external to the agent or his psycho-
logical setup, and with (iii) the actual laws of psychology, do not 
entail that S choose as he did at t.12
Is this the final analysis? I think we must make one more adjustment. 
(7) would give, I think, the wrong result in cases where the decision 
of the agent is the result of direct causal interference by an external 
force. If an angel swoops down from heaven and causes me to decide, 
in a manner that bypasses the psychological setup, to sing ‘God Save 
the Queen’, then wouldn’t I, if people complained about the noise 
and I were aware of what the angel had done, complain that I could 
not help it? But (7) would get the result that I could have helped it, 
because my not choosing to sing would be entirely consistent with 
my psychological setup, etc. just prior to the angel swooping down 
and causing me to decide to sing.
As a result, I think we must also suppose NI to be actually true, 
and the decision brought about in the proper manner for the ‘could 
have done otherwise’ claim to be true. So, in addition to the con-
tent generated by fm, we will have to add the non-interference claim 
alongside it. The final analysis of ‘S could have done otherwise at t’ 
is therefore:
(8) NI & ~({S’s psychological setup, E, NI, P} ⇒ ~(S intends 
otherwise at t)).
‘S couldn’t have done otherwise at t’ is just the negation of (9):
(9) ~(NI & ~({S’s psychological setup, E, NI, P} ⇒ ~(S intends 
otherwise at t))).
It might be thought that narrowing things down to whether or not 
an agent can intend otherwise given his psychological setup is too 
restrictive a model to handle the great variety of moral-responsibility 
contexts. Suppose a mugger holds a gun to my head and suggests it 
would be prudent for me to relinquish possession of my immediate 
finances. I agree and hand my wallet over. If, after the fact, someone 
12 For those desirous to know how my account would be incorporated into 
Kratzer’s later framework, it is achieved as follows: let the propositions detailing 
S’s instantiation of his psychological setup be the modal base. E, NI and P are to 
be considered as the ordering source.
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were to challenge the propriety of my doing so, I might well respond 
that ‘I couldn’t have done otherwise’. Such an expression would be 
strictly false on my account: after all, I could have formed the inten-
tion to fight the mugger. Or suppose I am tied up and a child drowns 
in front of me as I watch helplessly. I would again complain that I 
couldn’t have done otherwise. But this will likewise be false on my 
account: I could have intended differently.
One might think, therefore, that an account of the modal re-
striction that varies more widely in generated content given context 
would be desirable. In the mugging case, one might say, the modal 
restriction wouldn’t generate a description of my desires, but instead 
a set of rules about what are reasonable courses of action given the 
value of one’s life. In that case, what I mean when I say ‘I couldn’t 
have done otherwise’ is that my resisting the mugger was not pos-
sible relative to those rules. In the case of the drowning child, it 
might be suggested that the modal restriction would generate a list of 
all possible bodily exertions in that situation, such that the ‘I couldn’t 
help it’ claim expresses the conviction that relative to my position 
and the laws of nature, there was no possible bodily exertion that 
would have resulting in the breaking of my bonds.
Such an account might, at the end of the day, be a better way 
to go. There would be no type of modal restriction distinctive to 
moral-responsibility contexts in that case.13 Nevertheless, my more 
uniform account can still handle these sorts of examples. In the mug-
ging case, what I really mean when I say that ‘I couldn’t have done 
otherwise’ is that I couldn’t have reasonably done otherwise. In other 
words, yes, I could have done otherwise, but it wouldn’t have been 
reasonable to do so (because I would have been shot). In the drown-
ing child case, when I say that ‘I couldn’t have done otherwise’ I am 
again speaking loosely. Indeed, strictly speaking, I could have done 
otherwise, but what I mean is that, of all the things I could have in-
tended, none of them would have had the desired result (the rescuing 
of the child).
Whatever the advantages of variant accounts, it is the analysis 
given in (8) and (9) that I am defending on this particular occasion. It 
seems to get us what the compatibilist wants. It appears sufficient to 
13 I thank Pablo Rychter for this suggestion.
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ensure that the addict cannot do otherwise, yet doesn’t require any-
thing like the falsity of determinism. Furthermore, it avoids all the 
old objections to CAB. I have not analysed the ‘could have done oth-
erwise’ claim as a subjunctive conditional, and therefore the objec-
tions to the old classical compatibilism aimed to exploit this feature 
cannot be deployed against my proposal. I have made the suggestion 
that the alternative possibilities requirement on moral responsibility 
is concerned with compatibility or compossibility, rather than the truth 
of various ‘would’ conditionals: broadly speaking, just so long as an 
agent’s desiderative will is compatible with one deciding to do other-
wise, then one ‘could have done otherwise’ in the sense required for 
moral responsibility. Such, I suggest, is the compossibility that PAP 
is fundamentally concerned with.
5 Frankfurt and other considerations
Why might compatibilists have overlooked this suggestion? I think 
there are two reasons. Firstly, compatibilism has often been under-
stood, both by its proponents and its opponents, as precisely the 
claim that the rational will is fixed by the desiderative will! The 
traditional ‘strongest desire wins’ compatibilism of Hobbes (1651) 
and Edwards (1754), for instance, is a compatibilism that insists that 
our decisions are determined by what the understanding recognises 
as the strongest desire. I don’t think that such compatibilisms have 
an adequate way of handling overwhelming desires—the addict, if 
literally overwhelmed by his desire for a drug, surely has his respon-
sibility diminished, if not removed—so I don’t consider it a problem 
that my way of securing PAP is inconsistent with their proposals.
Secondly, it might be thought that the phrasing I reach for is too 
close to libertarian phraseology for comfort. Locating the freedom 
of the agent in what the agent does with his desires and so forth looks 
like exactly the sort of thing libertarians have demanded throughout 
the years. Well, I would concede that the theory I give here is a con-
cession of sorts to the libertarian: he was quite right to insist on a 
measure of independence for the rational will from the desiderative. 
It might then be wondered how I can concede this consistently with 
the truth of determinism. For if the desiderative will, or the psy-
chological setup more broadly, doesn’t determine the rational will, 
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then what does? But what lies between the psychological setup and 
the rational will? It is the agent. It is he who decides what is going 
to happen given the content of the desiderative will. Accordingly, 
I move that it is the individual nature of the agent that determines 
the rational will. I don’t mean by ‘nature’ the essential properties of 
the agent—they might not be essential to either being an agent or 
being that particular agent—I merely intend to describe categorical 
properties of the agent distinct from the psychological setup that I 
think explain why one decision rather than another is issued in typi-
cal cases of decision-making.
This helps make it clear how my theory differs from the libertar-
ian’s; for let ‘A’ denote S’s individual agential nature; then I am happy 
to agree that
(10) {S’s psychological setup, E, I, P, A} ⇒ ~(S intends otherwise at t)
can be true consistently with the truth of ‘S could have done other-
wise’ (in the moral-responsibility sense). But the libertarian denies 
this. For the libertarian insists that, broadly speaking, there must 
be no entailment from the psychological setup plus anything (or at 
least any hard fact14) to the rational will for the relevant possibil-
ity of doing otherwise to obtain. I contend for the weaker position 
that, speaking loosely, there must merely be no entailment from the 
psychological setup to the rational will. Nevertheless, still speaking 
loosely, I do believe that there is an entailment from the psychologi-
cal setup plus the nature of the agent to the rational will.
Finally, let’s deal with Frankfurt’s celebrated counterexample to 
PAP. Frankfurt was trying to give us an example where an agent was 
morally responsible for what he did, but couldn’t have done other-
wise. I think it should be clear, relative to my account of ‘could have 
done otherwise’, that Frankfurt’s scenario is one where Jones could 
have done otherwise. (8) is a conjunction, and so if Frankfurt’s coun-
terexample is to succeed, then at least one of these conjuncts will 
have to be false of Jones. Is the non-interference (NI) claim false? 
It is not. It is an important part of Frankfurt-style counterexamples 
that there is no actual interference by Black or his device at all. Such 
14 See Plantinga 1986 for an explanation of the distinction between hard and 
soft facts.
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things turn out to be entirely unnecessary in securing Jones’s deci-
sion. Is it the second conjunct that is false? Is there any entailment 
from Jones’s psychological setup, in conjunction with his continued 
existence, his not being interfered with, and the laws of psychology 
to his not doing otherwise than deciding to go ahead and kill Smith? 
We have no reason to think so. We would have, if Jones acted from 
an addiction or compulsion. But again, Jones’s decision is supposed 
to be (aside from its grim objective) a regular and ordinary piece 
of decision-making. Jones is not supposed to be driven along by an 
overwhelming inferno of desire. We do not, therefore, have any rea-
son to think that his decision to go ahead and kill Smith is entailed in 
the relevant way, quite the contrary.
Nor does Black’s brooding presence over Jones’s activity do any-
thing to affect this lack of entailment. The only way in which we 
could get the conclusion that Jones couldn’t do otherwise (in the rel-
evant sense) on account of Black is if the set of premises fm points us 
to includes a description of Black, his behaviour, his device, and his 
motives. But my account is of a fundamentally abstractive character: 
I am interested in whether or not the agent’s psychological setup, 
considered in the abstract, is consistent with a different intention being 
formed. So, fm will never stray so far outside the agent as to include 
someone else and their schemes in the set of premises it points us 
to, and for this reason Black will always be irrelevant, and all such 
Frankfurt-style counterexamples will fail to counter.15
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